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consequence of this is that equilibrium rent-taking increases with the intensity of 
equalization transfers. 
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*Corresponding author 1 Introduction
A common feature of federal economies is the existence of ﬁscal equalization programs that
entail monetary transfers from jurisdictions (‘states’ or ‘provinces’) with above-average ﬁscal
capacity to jurisdictions with lower-than-average ﬁscal capacity. These transfers thus ensure
that have-not jurisdictions have the necessary ﬁscal capacity to guarantee themselves the
national average level of public services per resident without imposing higher than average
tax rates.
It is well understood that such equalization transfers have eﬃciency consequences for the level
of taxation, by distorting ﬁscal policy incentives for receiving governments. For, equalization
transfers, by compensating jurisdictions for the adverse eﬀect of an increased tax rate on the
tax base (of the form familiar from Wildasin (1989)), induce those jurisdictions to raise taxes
higher than it is desirable from a national point of view, Smart (1998). Of course, federal
transfers that induce higher levels of eﬀort might not be welfare decreasing from a national
point of view if equilibrium local tax rates are too low (K¨ othenb¨ urger (2002), and Bucovetsky
and Smart (2006)).1
The implementation of any system of equalization transfers that is based on ﬁscal capacities
is bound to be complicated for two reasons. Firstly, there is the measurement of actual tax
bases. In the absence, as is typically the case, of collection agreements for most tax bases,
jurisdictions can and often deﬁne their own tax bases quite diﬀerently, (see, Boadway (1998),
(2004), and Smart (2005), for the Canadian equalization program). Secondly, equalization
formulae are typically complex lending support to the view of equalization programs as being
non-transparent and therefore less subject to democratic accountability than other govern-
ment policies. It is conceivable then—and indeed it is shown this here to be the case—that
such transfers, by equalizing ﬁscal capacity between jurisdictions in a rather nontransparent
manner, may interact with the incentives of policy makers to divert resources away from public
good provision and for personal gain. This possibility, though it has, implicitly or explicitly,
appeared in policy discussions has not attracted, to the best of our knowledge, any formal
analysis. And this is the objective of this paper: to develop a model within which issues of
accountability and equalization transfers can be articulated and investigated. It is shown that
an equalization system reduces the intensity of political competition and as such is conducive
to more rent-seeking activities.
1Empirical evidence for the impact of equalization on the tax setting behavior of lower level jurisdictions
is provided by Dahlby and Warren (2003) for Australia, Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2006) for Canada, and
B¨ uttner (2006) for Germany.
2The analysis of political competition presented here takes up the idea of relative performance
evaluation popularized in Public Finance by Besley and Case (1995).2 These contributions
consider the eﬀect of ‘yardstick’ competition on rent extraction and in particular on the se-
lection of ‘good’ incumbents. Like in these models, in the present paper voters of a typical
jurisdiction can evaluate the incumbent of their jurisdiction using information obtained from
observing the behavior of a neighboring jurisdiction. Unlike these contributions, however,
we consider the interaction between equalization transfers and the incentives arising from
elections.
We explore this aspect by considering a simple two period model with career concerns and
yardstick competition between the incumbents of two jurisdictions.3 In this model, the ﬁscal
capacity and thus the supply of public goods in a jurisdiction are aﬀected by the ‘competence’
and the extent of rent-seeking behavior of the local incumbent, but also by a shock which
is common across jurisdictions. Since voters cannot observe competence and rent-seeking
behavior nor the common shock, they assess the performance of the incumbent in their own
jurisdiction by comparing public goods supplies across jurisdictions. An incumbent who takes
more rents will see her jurisdiction fare worse in this comparison and, thus, her chances of
re-election are reduced.
We introduce a system of horizontal intergovernmental transfers into this setup where a frac-
tion of the diﬀerence between the jurisdictions’ ﬁscal capacities is equalized. To capture the
complexity of the equalization transfer, emphasized in the preceding paragraphs, we introduce
a random component in the determination of the ﬁscal capacity of jurisdictions by the agents.4
Therefore, even knowing the equalization rate, citizens cannot perfectly derive ﬁscal capaci-
ties from the supplies of public goods observed in both jurisdictions. Hence, the informational
content of the comparison across jurisdictions is reduced. By consequence, the adverse eﬀect
of increased rent-seeking by an incumbent on voters’ assessment of her performance is mit-
igated by equalization transfers. Thus, the incumbent politician’s trade-oﬀ between current
rents and the probability of winning the elections is tilted towards more rent diversion. Based
2This theory has been further developed by, among others, Besley and Smart (2003), Bordignon et al.
(2004), Belleﬂamme and Hindriks (2005), and Revelli (2006).
3As in Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 9.
4One, of course, may argue that interested parties may have the incentive (if they have the capability of
doing so) to precisely calculate ﬁscal capacities and inform voters, Smart (2005). Though this is a possibility
it does not seem to be a perfectly convincing one. For interested parties, typically, have opposing incentives
in the calculation of ﬁscal capacities giving scope for unlimited conﬂict over transfers. This conﬂict, as far as
the true ﬁscal capacities of the jurisdictions are concerned, is unlikely to be very informative and, therefore,
some uncertainty will still linger.
3on this eﬀect, it is shown that the amount of rents taken in a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium
increases in the equalization rate. This suggests that equalization payments may adversely
aﬀect the working of the political system and be conducive to misbehavior by incumbents.
Our work is part of the fast growing literature, termed the second-generation theory of ﬁs-
cal federalism (SGTF), that focuses on the political processes and the behavior of political
agents and their eﬀects on ﬁscal outcomes in federal systems (see Oates (2005), and Weingast
(2006) for comprehensive surveys on the SGTF literature). While identifying institutions and
political incentives rather than preferences and technology as the driving forces, this line of
research, like the ﬁrst generation theory of ﬁscal federalism, aims at explaining the main char-
acteristics of federal systems, such as the vertical allocation of powers or equalization transfers.
Consequently, a ﬁrst and major task has been to develop a political theory of the beneﬁts and
drawbacks of decentralization (see Seabright (1996), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Lockwood
(2002), and Hindriks and Lockwood (2005)).
Equalization transfers, which are at the heart of our analysis, have also received some at-
tention in the second-generation theory of ﬁscal federalism. For example, Inman (1998) and
Johansson (2003) provide a rationale for the empirical observation that variations in transfers
to jurisdictions cannot be explained by traditional concerns of equity and eﬃciency alone.
Variables representing political incentives are additional and signiﬁcant determinants of these
transfers. While this is an important issue, our focus here is not on the political causes of
equalization, but rather on the interplay between accountability and equalization transfers.
This issue is brieﬂy touched upon in Smart (2005). More formally, Careaga and Weingast
(2003) show that the common pool problem created by revenue sharing induces lower level
governments to divert resources away from productive use, a prediction validated by empirical
results from Mexican states. Similarly, Baretti et al. (2002) show that the outﬂow of tax
revenues caused by equalization reduces the eﬀorts by German states to enforce and collect
federal taxes. Finally, Boarnet and Glazer (2002) show that spending in U.S. states is lower
when neighboring states obtain larger federal grants. According to this latter contribution
this occurs because politicians at the state level are considered to be incompetent when they
fail to win federal grants and as consequence a rational response by voters is to force them
cut public spending. To this line of research, which is mainly empirical in nature, our work
contributes by providing a formal model suitable to analyze the impact of ﬁscal equalization
on the political incentives provided by elections.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model while Section 3
presents its equilibrium. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
42 Description of the model
We consider a model with two periods and two jurisdictions labeled i = 1;2 which are ex
ante identical. There is electoral accountability in the sense that voters hold incumbents
accountable ex post for incompetent behavior in oﬃce. This occurs in an election at the end
of period 1 (described in subsection 2.3). There is a representative citizen in each jurisdiction
whose income per period is normalized, for convenience, to 1. The citizen pays an exogenously
ﬁxed tax of ¯ ¿ per period. The supply of the public good in jurisdiction i = 1;2 in period 1
is denoted by gi, whereas g2
i denotes public good supply in period 2.5 The supply of public
goods in each period is determined by the ﬁscal capacity of a given jurisdiction (introduced
in subsection 2.1) and the ﬁscal equalization scheme that is in place (introduced in subsection
2.2).
2.1 Determination of ﬁscal capacity
Fiscal capacity ¿i in jurisdiction i = 1;2 depends on the ‘ability’ (equivalently ‘competence’)
of the incumbent politician in the given jurisdiction, denoted by ´i, the common economic
environment of the federation ", and the actions of the incumbent politician in terms of the
resources diverted away from public good provision towards own consumption, denoted by
ri. The competence level ´i, which is a permanent feature of incumbent i = 1;2, and the
economic environment of the federation ", which is common to both jurisdictions, are both
stochastic and unknown to both voters and incumbents. In particular, the abilities of ﬁrst
period incumbents are identically and independently distributed normal random variables with
mean ¹´ = 1 and variance ¾2
´. The common shock " is normally distributed with mean ¹" = 0
and variance ¾2
", and is independent from both competence levels ´1 and ´2.
In period 1, the incumbent politician in jurisdiction i = 1;2 decides to take rents ri, out of the
tax revenues collected ¯ ¿. These choices are not observed by voters before the election. Rents
cannot, of course, be negative and so ri ¸ 0, i = 1;2. It is also assumed that rents satisfy
¯ ¿ > ¯ r ¸ ri, i = 1;2.6 The remaining revenues ¯ ¿ ¡ ri are transformed into ﬁscal capacities ¿i
as follows
¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ri); i = 1;2: (1)
5We denote, throughout, second period variables by the superscript 2. Also, for ease of notation, we drop
the time index for variables relating to the ﬁrst period.
6A possible, and arguably convincing, reason for this restriction is the possibility that a zero provision of
public goods triggers an immediate investigation by an independent authority, such as the constitutional court,
into the workings of the government.
5Equation (1) simply states that, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of competence of the
incumbent of a jurisdiction the higher the ﬁscal capacity of that jurisdiction. Similarly, the
better the economic environment of the federation, all other things being equal, the better the
ﬁscal capacity of both jurisdictions.
2.2 The ﬁscal equalization program
In practice a typical tax-base-equalization program has the following structure. For the rev-
enue source a base is chosen to represent, as closely as possible, the actual base of that revenue
source. Total revenues for all jurisdictions from that source are then divided by the nationwide
base to arrive at a ‘national average revenue rate’. This rate is then applied to the base in a
particular jurisdiction and the resulting tax is divided by the provincial population to obtain
the per capita yield of the tax at the national average rate. The diﬀerence between the ju-
risdiction’s per capita yield and the national per capita yield, multiplied by the jurisdiction’s
population, represents the base for calculating the equalization payments due to the jurisdic-
tion with respect to that particular revenue source. If the diﬀerence is negative (positive), a
certain fraction of the diﬀerence, called the equalization rate, is paid out to (collected from)
the jurisdiction.7
As noted in the introductory section, the assessment of ﬁscal capacity in equalization programs
is inherently complex. To capture this complexity we introduce the random variable8 Γi,
i = 1;2, and assume that the ﬁscal capacity of jurisdiction i = 1;2 is overestimated by the
amount Γi. It is thus the value of ¿i +Γi, instead of the true ﬁscal capacity ¿i, that enters the
equalization formula. The speciﬁc form of this variable is given by
Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ rj)°i; i = 1;2; (2)
where °i is normally distributed with mean ¹° = 0 and variance ¾2
°. The random variable
°i, i = 1;2, is unknown both to voters and incumbents, they are independent from each
7This is, for instance, a variant of the equalization systems in Canada and Germany. In Canada the
equalization rate is constant (derived from using a ﬁve-province standard) and the ‘gross system’ is applicable
whereby only positive equalization entitlements are paid. In Germany the equalization rate varies with the
diﬀerence between the jurisdiction’s own ﬁscal capacity and the average ﬁscal capacity in the federation but
the ‘net system’ is applicable whereby both positive and negative transfers exist.
8While we rather interpret the shock Γi, i = 1;2, as a mistake in the assessment of ﬁscal capacity, as noted
in the introductory section, one might also think of this as a deliberate deviation from pure equalization. Such
a deviation might be enacted by the federal government so as to favor some particular jurisdiction. For the
present analysis this interpretation would ﬁt the model as long as this bias in the federal government’s policy
cannot be predicted by voters nor local incumbents. Another possible interpretation might be that citizens do
not fully observe and understand the mechanics of the equalization system.
6other, and also independent from ´1;´2, and ". This formulation reﬂects the idea that in each
jurisdiction i there is an exogenous source of measurement error °i per unit of revenues so
that the total error is proportional to the average revenues spent for public good provision.
Thus, the random element of the equalization scheme has the same order of magnitude as
the incumbent’s competence and the overall economic shock. Consequently, a change in rent-
taking does not directly aﬀect the relative importance of the incumbent’s ability in determining
the supply of public goods.





¡ (¿i + Γi)
¸
; (3)
where 1 ¸ t ¸ 0 is the federation’s equalization rate. Naturally, since the budget of the federal
economy must balance, we have that Σizi = 0.
Public good provision in jurisdictions i = 1;2 is, then, given by
gi = ¿i + zi;
= ¿i + (t=2)(¿j ¡ ¿i + Γj ¡ Γi); (4)
where the second equality follows from (3), and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i denotes the other jurisdiction.
Making now use of (2) in (4) for both jurisdictions and solving these equations simultaneously,
one obtains, for i = 1;2 and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, the level of ﬁscal capacities ¿i conditional upon
the public good supplies in the own and other jurisdiction, gi and gj, respectively, that is
¿i = gi + µ(gi ¡ gj + Γi ¡ Γj); (5)
where
µ(t) = t=2(1 ¡ t) ¸ 0: (6)
The inequality in (6) follows from the restriction on the equalization rate. Notice now, for
later use, that, following (6)9
µ
0(t) = 2(1 ¡ t)
¡2 > 0; (7)
and so µ is a monotonically increasing function of the equalization rate t. However, since
citizens are not informed about °1 nor °2 they cannot infer ﬁscal capacities from the observation
of g1 and g2. Instead, they must form expectations about ﬁscal capacities, and the underlying
competence levels of the incumbents.
9A prime denotes the derivative of a function of one variable.
72.3 Payoﬀs and second period decisions
In period 2, ﬁscal capacities and the equalization scheme determine public goods supplies g2
i,
i = 1;2, just as in period 1, by equations analogous to (1)-(4). For the ﬁscal capacity in
jurisdiction i = 1;2, however, now the competence of the government in the second period
is relevant. This is either the competence ´i of the ﬁrst period incumbent, if the latter is
re-elected, or, if she is defeated, the competence of a challenger which is drawn from the
same normal distribution with mean ¹´ = 1 and variance ¾´. Moreover, the second period
government decides on a second period rent r2
i which satisﬁes the same restrictions as the ﬁrst
period rent, that is, r2
i ¸ 0 and ¯ ¿ > ¯ r ¸ r2
i; i = 1;2:
Politicians are interested in expropriating rents collected in both periods and in an exogenous
additional rent from winning the elections, denoted by R > 0. Denoting by ± the discount
factor and by pI;i the probability that the incumbent of jurisdiction i = 1;2 is re-elected for
oﬃce in the second period, the payoﬀ to the incumbent of jurisdiction i is given by
ri + pI;i ¢ ±(R + r
2
i): (8)
Citizens value public goods more than private consumption. Thus, for some constant ® > 1,
the utility of citizens in jurisdiction i = 1;2 is given by
ui = 1 ¡ ¯ ¿ + ®gi + ±
¡





In the second period there is no re-election motive anymore and thus every government will
take the maximal rent r2
i = ¯ r;i = 1;2. Nevertheless, given that ¯ ¿ > ¯ r, there always remains
some tax revenue which is used for public good provision. Thus for given maximal rent-
taking behavior a more competent incumbent still produces a higher ﬁscal capacity. Now,
as can be seen from (4), for all equalization rates 0 · t · 1, the supply of public goods
in a jurisdiction is increasing in the ﬁscal capacity of this jurisdiction. Therefore, a more
competent government in a jurisdiction will deliver a higher quantity of the public good to
that jurisdiction’s citizens. Hence, the citizens in both jurisdictions have an incentive to elect
the most competent incumbent. Consequently, in the election at the end of the ﬁrst period
voters in jurisdiction i = 1;2 vote for the incumbent if their estimate of the incumbent’s ability
˜ ´i exceeds the expected ability of the challenger, which is given by ¹´ = 1.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The model is analyzed using the Nash equilibrium concept under which the decisions by voters
and incumbents in the ﬁrst period are simultaneously optimal, given a correct assumption
8on the other players’ behavior. Following this the optimal voting behavior of citizens in
jurisdiction i = 1;2 is determined by the estimate ˜ ´i they form about the competence of the
incumbent in this jurisdiction. This estimate is based on the information citizens have at that
moment and on an assumption about the rent-taking behavior of both incumbents, denoted
by ˜ ri, for i = 1;2.10 In subsection 3.1, the formation of the expectation ˜ ´i, i = 1;2, conditional
on ˜ ri and ˜ rj, for j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, is analyzed.
The incumbent of jurisdiction i = 1;2 decides about how much rents ri to expropriate antici-
pating the impact of this decision on the estimate ˜ ´i and, hence, on the probability of winning
the election. This is described in subsection 3.2. An equilibrium requires that the actual de-
cisions coincide with the assumptions used by the voters, that is, ˜ ri = ri for i = 1;2. To keep
the analysis tractable, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where the incumbents of
both jurisdictions take the same rent r, that is, r1 = r2 = r. In subsection 3.3 the rent taken
in such an equilibrium is calculated. The analysis is then completed by deriving the impact
of an increase in the equalization rate on this rent.
3.1 The citizens’ estimate of the incumbent’s ability
To describe how voters in jurisdiction i = 1;2 rationally form the estimate ˜ ´i, consider the
information they possess at the time of the elections. They know that the incumbent maxi-
mizes (8), and they also know the level of tax ¯ ¿ as well as the equalization rate t. Moreover,
they observe the level of public good supplied in both jurisdictions gi;i = 1;2.
It is convenient to describe the citizens’ estimate in terms of a statistic Si deﬁned for i = 1;2




gi + µ(gi ¡ gj)
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (10)
It is intuitive that the statistic in (10) uses only the information available to the voters,
together with the assumption ˜ ri about the amount of rents diverted by incumbent i in period
1. Following from (5), the statistic in the deﬁnition in (10) becomes
Si =
¿i + µ(Γj ¡ Γi)
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (11)
If citizens now believe that ˜ r1 and ˜ r2 are being chosen by the incumbents then they will
believe that ﬁscal capacities and measurement errors are given by ¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri) and
10The supposed strategies ˜ ri, i = 1;2, just as the rents ri, i = 1;2, actually chosen, do not depend on the
levels of competence ´i since when the rents are chosen competence is not known to the incumbents.
9Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri)°i, i = 1;2. This, in turn, implies–following (11)–that for i = 1;2 and j 2
f1;2g;j 6= i,





¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ rj
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (13)
Equation (12) shows why it is useful to deﬁne the particular statistics Si, i = 1;2. As seen from
(5), the numerators in Si (in (10)) are naive estimates of the ﬁscal capacity in the respective
jurisdiction, which are obtained by ignoring the assessment mistakes Γi, i = 1;2. By dividing
this estimate through the tax rate after the presumed rent one obtains a random number which
is additively composed of the competence of the incumbent in one’s own jurisdiction and the
random shocks. Thus, for both jurisdictions i = 1;2, citizens’ estimate ˜ ´i of the ability of
the i-incumbent can be determined additively from the observed statistic Si and the expected
values of ";°1, and °2, conditional on the information summarized in the statistics S1 and S2.
Denoting these conditional expectations by E("jS1;S2) and E(°ijS1;S2) for i = 1;2, one so
obtains from (12) for i = 1;2 and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i,
˜ ´i = Si ¡ E("jS1;S2) + µ[E(°ijS1;S2) ¡ ˜ ½jE(°jjS1; S2)] : (14)
In equation (14), the ﬁve random variables ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) determine the estimate ˜ ´i. Now
following from (12), ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) = ("; °1; °2; ´1+"+µ(˜ ½2°2¡°1); ´2+"+µ(˜ ½1°1¡°2)).
Hence the joint distribution of the random vector ("; °1; °2; S1; S2), as perceived by the
citizens, is the same as for the vector of random variables ("; °1; °2; ´1 + " + µ(˜ ½2°2 ¡
°1); ´2 + " + µ(˜ ½1°1 ¡ °2)). In Appendix A.1 it is shown that, based on this identity, the
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Equation (15) shows, clearly, the working of yardstick competition in this model. When
evaluating the performance of the incumbent in their own jurisdiction, citizens in jurisdiction
i do not only consider the signal Si that relates to the ﬁscal capacity in jurisdiction i, but also
the signal Sj that relates to the neighboring jurisdiction j.
We now turn to analyzing how the incumbent in jurisdiction i uses the estimate derived in
(15) in order to assess her probability of winning the election.
103.2 The incumbent’s decision in jurisdiction i
As explained in subsection 2.3, voters will re-elect the incumbent of jurisdiction i if the estimate
in (15) is at least as large as the expected competence of the challenger, ¹´ = 1. Thus, when
choosing rents ri in period 1, the incumbent politician of jurisdiction i perceives the probability
of her re-election to be pI;i = Probf˜ ´i ¸ ¹´g = Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g: Central to this choice problem
for the incumbent is the impact of an increase in the rent ri on this probability.
The probability distribution of ˜ ´i depends on the distribution of the federation-wide shock "
and of the measurement errors °1 and °2 but also on the distribution of the competence ´j of
the incumbent in the other jurisdiction j 6= i, since the statistic Sj, which depends on ´j, enters
˜ ´i in (15). Moreover, since, by assumption, the incumbent does not know her competence, the
distribution of ˜ ´i also depends on the distribution of ´i (and not the realization of ´i drawn
by the particular incumbent). In addition to the random variables, ˜ ´i is also aﬀected by the
strategies ˜ r1 and ˜ r2 supposed by the citizens, which are given for the politicians, and, hence,
can be treated as parameters. However, by choosing the actual strategy ri, the incumbent of
jurisdiction i aﬀects ﬁscal capacity ¿i and hence, via the equalization program, both statistics
S1 and S2. Thus, by choosing the rent ri the incumbent inﬂuences the observation available to
voters. Similarly, the rent rj actually taken by the incumbent in the other jurisdiction j 6= i
aﬀects ˜ ´i by inﬂuencing ¿j and hence S1 and S2.
To obtain the probability distribution of ˜ ´i in equation (15) we follow this reasoning and
replace, for i = 1;2, ¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ri) and Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ ri)°i in Si from (11). In doing so one
obtains for both i = 1;2, and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i
Si =
¯ ¿ ¡ ri
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
(´i + ") + µ
(¯ ¿ ¡ rj)°j + (¯ ¿ ¡ ri)°i
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (17)
Making use of (17) for both jurisdictions in (15), it is shown in Appendix A.2, that the estimate
˜ ´i, for i = 1;2;j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, can be written as a weighted sum of independent normal
random variables
˜ ´i = a1(ri)´i + a2(rj)´j + a3(ri;rj)" + a4(ri)°i + a5(rj)°j + ao: (18)
The notation illustrates that the weights are functions of the strategies ri and rj, while their
dependence on the equalization parameter µ, for brevity, is not displayed. From (18), ˜ ´i is itself
normally distributed. Using this fact, and making use of E(") = E(°i) = 0 and E(´i) = 1 for
i = 1;2, one can straightforwardly show that the expectation and variance of the distribution
11of ˜ ´i, are given, respectively, by
¹i(r1;r2;µ) = a1(ri)E(´i) + a2(rj)E(´j) + a3(ri;rj)E(")
+a4(ri)E(°i) + a5(rj)E(°j) + ao























where a0;a1;a2;a3;a4 and a5 are deﬁned in (A.6) in the Appendix, and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i.
Having computed the expectation and variance of the distribution of ˜ ´i, we are now in a
position to solve the maximization problem of the incumbent in jurisdiction i. Following from
(8), the incumbent chooses ri to maximize ri+Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g¢±(R+¯ r); with necessary condition
given by
1 +
@ Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g
@ri
¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (21)
Using normality, the re-election probability is given by




i) is the normal distribution with mean ¹i and variance ¾2
i, and ¹i(r1;r2;µ),
¾2
i(r1;r2;µ) are as deﬁned in (19) and (20), respectively.






















¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (23)
Notice that, for later use, diﬀerentiation of F(1;¹i;¾2
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; (24)
where f(¢) is the density of the (¹i;¾2
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(25)
























jΣ22j(¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri)
: (26)
We turn now to the characterization of the equilibrium.
123.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
We conﬁne attention to a symmetric equilibrium, an equilibrium that is in which in both
jurisdictions incumbents take the same rent r = r1 = ˜ r1 = r2 = ˜ r2. Then, following from (13),
˜ ½1 = ˜ ½2 = 1: This implies ﬁrst that the expectation and variance of the estimates ˜ ´1 and ˜ ´2 are
equal, ¹i(r1;r2;µ) = ¹(r;r;µ) and ¾2
i(r1;r2;µ) = ¾2(r;r;µ) for i = 1;2. Moreover, following
from (19), the deﬁnition of the weights a1(r);a2(r), and ao (as stated in (A.6)), and (16) one
obtains ¹(r;r;µ) = 1. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium the mean estimate of the incumbent’s
competence equals the ex ante expected competence ¹´. This implies, following also from
the symmetry of the normal distribution, that in equilibrium the incumbent is re-elected with
probability 1 ¡ F(1;¹(r;r;µ);¾2(r;r;µ)) = 1=2.
Since, irrespective of the variance, the normal distribution has half of the probability mass
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jΣ22j(¯ ¿ ¡ r)
¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (29)
The necessary condition (29) allows to characterize the behavior of the incumbents in the
equilibrium. Considering the dependence of ¾(r;r;µ) on r according to (20), this equation can
be solved to yield explicitly the equilibrium rent-taking, as stated in the following result.
Proposition 1 Rents taken in the ﬁrst period, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, are uniquely
determined and given by





















¢ ±(R + ¯ r): (30)
Proof of Proposition 1. See Appendix A.3. ¤
Proposition 1 is central to the paper. Close inspection of this result reveals that the equilibrium
level of rents taken by the incumbents in both jurisdictions critically depends on the variance
13of competence, ¾2
´, the variance of the federation wide economic shock, ¾2
", the variance of the
measurement error to the equalization transfer, ¾2
°, but also µ(t). It is the latter dependence
that is at the center of the investigation here.
Focusing on the equalization transfer rate, t, one observes that, for given noises of competence,
economic environment, and transfers, and as long as the equalization transfer is bounded away
from zero, equalization transfers increase rent-taking behavior in a federal economy. More
speciﬁcally, one can arrive at the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 With the rate of equalization bounded away from zero, an increase in the
equalization rate increases equilibrium rent-taking.
Proof of Proposition 2. See Appendix A.4. ¤
The result of Proposition 2 shows that ﬁscal equalization programs tilt the incumbent politi-
cian’s trade-oﬀ between current rents and the probability of winning the elections towards
more rent diversion. In this trade-oﬀ, the marginal cost of an additional unit of rent diversion,
determined by the loss in the probability of winning the election as given by the second term
in (23), is aﬀected by the equalization rate. To see how, observe that this marginal cost is
composed of two components. First, an increase in rent-taking worsens the signal Si, and,
hence, on average citizens will attribute a lower competence to the incumbent, as expressed
by the term @¹i=@ri in (23). Second, for each unit by which this average estimate is reduced,
the probability of re-election is reduced according to the density f = ¡@F=@¹i.11
If the equalization rate is increased, the ﬁrst component of marginal cost is reduced in size.
That is, with a higher equalization rate, citizens’ estimate of the incumbent’s competence
reacts less strongly to an increase in rents ri. This occurs because the signal Si is increasingly
determined by the noise introduced by equalization and consequently any given change in
observation produced by a given change in rents diversion is increasingly attributed by citizens
to this noise rather than to competence. Essentially, equalization reduces the quality of the
information available to citizens and hence rent-taking by the incumbent is less likely to be
interpreted as incompetence.
Turning to the second component, we note that with an increasing equalization rate, the
statistics Si, i = 1;2 vary more strongly with the noise in the equalization system, and
hence they convey less information about the realization of the incumbents’ competence ´i.
11Recall that the second term in the square brackets in (23) is zero in a symmetric equilibrium.
14Consequently, for given rent-taking strategies, the citizens have less reason to update their
estimate of the competence from the ex ante expectation ¹´, placing more probability mass
close to the ex ante mean ¹´. This implies that the density of the estimate increases if
the equalization rate increases such that from this eﬀect the marginal cost of rent diversion
increases as equalization is intensiﬁed. Proposition 2 shows, however, that the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates and that the marginal cost of rent diversion is decreased by equalization.
The mistake in the assessment of ﬁscal capacity is crucial for the eﬀect analyzed in Proposition
2. Thus, one should expect that if there is no such mistake that is, if ¾2
° = 0, the incumbent
politicians cannot ‘successfully’ hide behind the noise that exists in the equalization system,
and so choose the same rents as without equalization. Indeed this is the case. The following
corollary emphasizes this:
Corollary 1 An increase in the equalization rate t has no eﬀect on the equilibrium rents taken
by the incumbent politicians if ¾2
° = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof of the Corollary readily follows from equation (A.9) in the
proof of Proposition 2. ¤
The appeal of Corollary 1 (and Proposition 1) is in helping to move the discussion towards very
practical policy issues. For given uncertainty in the level of competence of incumbents and
the economic environment, what ultimately matters for rent diversion in a multi-jurisdictional
system with elections is not equalization per se but rather how complex the implementation of
the equalization program itself is. Interestingly, this result, thus, provides a theoretical foun-
dation for the popular demand to improve transparency of equalization systems by reducing
their complexity.
4 Concluding remarks
A lot of attention has been paid to the eﬃciency properties of equalization schemes. A rather
neglected issue of equalization transfers is how they interact with the incentives of incumbent
politicians to divert resources away from public good provision and for personal gain. This
paper has explored this aspect. It was shown that an increase in the equalization rate, starting
from a strictly positive rate of equalization, tilts the incentive of the incumbents towards more
rent extraction.
The analysis presented here suggests a number of extensions, that we now brieﬂy discuss.
Firstly, the impact of equalization on the informational content of public goods supplies has
15been modeled in a rather speciﬁc way, by assuming that ﬁscal capacities are imperfectly
measured. It remains an open question at this point whether other forms of incomplete
information in the equalization program (one, for example, might be to introduce uncertainty
in the equalization rate rather than the assessment of ﬁscal capacities) will produce similar
results.
Secondly, under some circumstances equalization programs might improve, rather than impair,
the information available to voters, since they might make otherwise heterogeneous jurisdic-
tions more comparable. For such an eﬀect to prevail, it is reasonable for one to conjecture, that
the equalization system should treat local random shocks diﬀerently from the consequences of
the actions taken by incompetent, or selﬁsh, politicians. It is certainly worthwhile for future
work to analyze under what conditions it is possible to implement such a scheme.
Thirdly, instead of assuming symmetric, incomplete information about the ability of the in-
cumbent, it appears that another appealing information assumption is to suppose that the
incumbent knows her own competence and chooses rents so as to signal her type to the elec-
torate. Whether, and how, such signalling would be aﬀected by the presence of equalization
transfers, is an interesting and challenging question.
Finally, from a normative point of view, the result of Proposition 2 appears to suggest that
equalization transfers in a federal economy have a negative impact on welfare since they may
increase rent-seeking behavior. On the other hand, they do, of course, equalize ﬁscal capacities
which, in a richer model, might provide a beneﬁcial insurance eﬀect (as in Lockwood, 1999).
The overall impact of an equalization system on welfare, therefore, should be judged on the
basis of a genuine comparison between the negative political aspect of equalization entitlements
and the insurance beneﬁt arising from the equalization of jurisdiction-speciﬁc shocks.
While these extensions are left for future research, the result presented here shows that the
interaction of ﬁscal equalization and political incentives is an issue which deserves further
attention.
16Appendices
A.1 Proof of equation (15).
The vector of random variables ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) = ("; °1; °2; ´1+"+µ(˜ ½2°2¡°1); ´2+"+
µ(˜ ½1°1 ¡°2)) has an absolute continuous distribution and hence, following De Groot (1970, p.
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Solving (A.2) with the help of (A.1), one ﬁnds


































































(1 ¡ ˜ ½i)¾
2
´; (A.4)
where jΣ22j is as in (16). Substituting (A.3)-(A.4) into (14), after some simpliﬁcation, one
obtains (15). ¤
17A.2 Proof of equation (18).
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With the weights deﬁned as illustrated by the braces, (A.6) reduces to (18). ¤
18A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by evaluating ¾2















































































































Taking now the square root of (A.7) and substituting into (29) gives (30). ¤
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.


































































ª¡1=2 = ±(R + ¯ r)=(¯ ¿ ¡ r), equation (A.8)
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2(¯ ¿ ¡ r)
¢ µ
0(t): (A.9)
For µ > 0 and with, following (7), µ0(t) > 0, (A.9) is strictly positive. ¤
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